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I. INTRODUCTION
Tax law is an important regulatory means for implementing our notion of the just society.' Do we value individual enterprise or preserving a
* Assistant Professor of Law, Co-Director Law & Business Program, American University,
Washington College of Law; B.A. Columbia University, 1988; M.A., The University of Virginia,
1993; J.D., The University of Virginia School of Law, 1993. I would like to thank Anne Alstott,
Joseph Bankman, James Boyle, Daniel Farber, Barbara Fried, lrum Hasan-Khan, Michael Livingston, Andy Pike, Janet Spragens, David Weisbach, Joan Williams, and Larry Zelenack for their
comments at various stages of this project's development. Any errors are my own.
1. The current political landscape makes clear the relevance of tax to the "big issues." Most
of the recent debates on social policy, from family values to corporate welfare, focus on the tax
system as both the cause of social decay and injustice, and a major hope for radical reform. See, e.g.,
CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWr GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY, AND
THE HOUSE REPUBUCANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 85-90 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Scbellhas eds.,
1994) (discussing tax reform as the chief mechanism to; implement new values); CHISTIAN
COATIXON, CONTRACT wITH THE AMERICAN FAMILY: A BOLD PLAN BY THE CHRISTIAN
COALMON TO STRENGTHEN THE FAMILY AND REsTORE COMMON-SENSE VALUES (1995); Eric

Black, PerotStands Out on Taxes, Plan to Cut Deficit; But Positionson Other MajorIssues Lack a
Main Component: How Would He Do It?, STAR TRIB., Oct. 18, 1992, at 16A, Perot'sEconomic Pill
Might Not Be All That Bitter, BUS. WK., Oct. 12, 1992, at 30; Robert B. Reich, How to Avoid These
Layoffs?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1996, at A21 (encouraging a tax-based carrot and stick approach to
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decent life for all individuals? Are we social democrats or libertarians?
The structure of our tax system reflects our answers to these basic philosophical questions. At its best, normative tax policy challenges these
answers, by exploring their implications and contrasting them with other
possible visions of the good life.
Despite its central role in connecting these most fundamental philosophical issues to actual legal structures, tax law has traditionally not
attracted anywhere near the level of interdisciplinary attention enjoyed
by other areas of the law.2 It could even be said that tax law scholarship
has developed as a theoretical Galapagos Islands, largely insulated by
interdisciplinary movements affecting other areas of the law, though that
has begun to change in recent years! This does not mean that the prevailing methods are necessarily primitive. On the contrary, isolation can
yield significant innovation. Tax scholars were engaged in economic
analysis, for instance, long before economic analysis became so widely
used in all other areas of legal scholarship.! No amount of sophisticated
economic analysis, however, can help shed light on the kind of funda-

promote greater "corporate responsibility"). Historically. of course, taxation was often the flash
point for political and social change. See Edward J. McCaffery, Tax's Empire, 85 GEO. LJ. 71, 7374, 121-28 (1996) (discussing the role of taxes in the American Revolution and the importance of
tax issues to the authors of the FederalistPapers). Furthermore, the public's intense interest in tax
policy can literally make or break a political candidate, as Steve Forbes's flat tax campaign attests.
See Carl Rowan, IfForbes Becomes President,God Help Us, Ctt. SuN-ThMuS, Feb. 7, 1996, at 43
(noting Forbes's status as "the New Republican phenomenon" and criticizing him for emphasizing
the flat tax plank of his political platform). Finally, congressional hearings on IRS abuses gamered
national attention. See Andrew Sullivan, The Tax That Could Revive Conservatism, SUNDAY TfMES
(London), Oct. 5, 1997, at 6.
2. Indeed, under some accounts of the hierarchy of disciplines within the legal academy, tax
law ranks close to the bottom. See Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and
Credentials: The Truth About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring,97 COLUM. L. REV. 199,
266 (1997) (describing tax as a less prestigious area of scholarship).
3. Increasingly, the field is becoming much more interdisciplinary, with tax scholars bringing
perspectives as diverse as libertarianism and feminism to reexamine traditional problems. See generally, BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALs'FOTT, TIM STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (forthcoming 1999); Anne
L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 2001 (1996) (considering feminist goals in tax policy); Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and
Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 1469 (1997)
(describing the bias in the federal tax laws based on race, class, and gender); Marjorie E. Komhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86
MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987) (arguing for progressive taxation based on feminist views of humanity);
Edward J. McCaffery, The UCLA Tax Policy Conference: Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1861, 1861 (1994) (noting that cognitive theory "has much to offer the study of taxation");
Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairnessor Unfairness?A Considerationof the PhilosophicalBasesfor
Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAx POL'Y 221 (1995) (challenging the idea that fairness requires some taxpayers to bear more of the burden than others).
4. As demonstrated infra, Part 11,tax scholarship's isolation from self-consciously interdisciplinary movements such as law and economics may have helped it avoid some of the problems
associated with the broader claims of the law and economics movement. See generalty RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE at xiv (1990) (acknowledging the Chicago School's
"thin and unsatisfying epistemology").

19981

ANALYZING FAIRNESS PRINCIPLESIN TAX POUCY

157

mental philosophical issues that shape tax law at its most basic level. For

these more philosophical questions, other strategies are required.
One possible strategy, of course, is to assume that such questions
are basically unanswerable, that issues of fairness, justice and the good
life are matters of the heart, not of the head, settled by emotions and not
scholarly analysis! Under this strategy, leaving questions of fairness
unanalyzed is a perfectly legitimate way of conducting tax policy scholarship, even if tax law is the area of law where these questions need answering most. Employing this strategy in tax and other areas of the law
may seem perfectly natural, reflecting as it does a view of the status of
fairness claims quite deeply embedded in the intellectual culture at large."
As this article demonstrates, however, such a strategy is anything but
natural, as it relies on a philosophical view of the status of fairness
claims Once this particular philosophical view is abandoned, the availability of alternative philosophical approaches to fairness becomes clear.
5. This article uses the term "fairness" to encompass all issues of equity and distributive
justice in tax policy.
6. In discussing broader methodological issues in tax law, this article tries to explain the
persistence of formalism in the discourse that has been identified by others. See, e.g., Thomas D.
Griffith, Theories of PersonalDeductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 343, 343-45 (1989)
(noting the lack of normative principles in the tax theories of several scholars); Louis Kaplow,
Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax, 80 VA. L. REV. 1477, 1513 (1994) (explaining that tax
design should not be formalistic but based on "fundamental moral principles or views of distributive
justice"); Louis Kaplow, A FundamentalObjection to Tax Equity Norms: A Callfor Utilitarianism,
48 NAT'L TAX J. 497 (1995) (recommending a utilitarian approach to tax policy); McCaffery, supra
note I (identifying formalism in the discourse); Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 365, 386, 390
(1998) (identifying deficiencies in the current discourse and suggesting alternatives).
7. The philosophical view referred to here is "emotivism," which (as a corollary to "logical
positivism") views ethical statements as cognitively meaningless. For a partisan account of the rise
of logical positivism and emotivism, see HANS REICHENBACH, THE RISE OF SCtENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY
at vii, 276-302 (1951). This view is so much a part of our intellectual culture that subsequent ethical
views (like the pragmatism endorsed in this article) often define themselves by reference to it. See
Russell B. Goodman, Introduction to PRAGMATISM: A CONTEMPORARY READER 1, 8 (Russell B.
Goodman ed., 1995).
8. The downside of tax scholarship's isolation from the interdisciplinary debates in the legal
academy lies here, in its treatment of fairness issues. It may be that, to change the traditional way of
analyzing fairness issues in tax scholarship, the tax policy discourse must engage in the types of
reflections on methodology that proliferate in jurisprudential scholarship. See, e.g., Robert Justin
Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalismand the New Fuzziness: The Role of Wide Reflective
Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 874-76 (1990) (explaining the persistence
of skepticism in legal reasoning); Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARv. L REV. 877
(1997) (comparing the discipline of law to phrenology, and questioning its legitimacy as a discipline
of knowledge). Indeed, these types of reflections are occurring more and more in the tax policy
discourse. See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 6; McCaffery, supranote 1; see also Thomas D. Griffith,
Should "Tax Norms" Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy Analysis and the Taxation of Personal
Injury Recoveries, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 11 15 (recommending a normative approach to tax policy).
This article also speculates on method. In doing so, it raises further issues (such as whether there is a
pragmatic "method" which can avoid philosophical theory, taken up briefly in Part IV) that have also
been addressed in the jurisprudential work. See, e.g., Richard Rorty, Pragmatismand Law: A Response to David Luban, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 75 (1996) (questioning the relevance of pragmatist
theory to law).
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One obvious candidate is philosophical pragmatism, which has been so
influential in legal scholarship as well as the general culture. This article
explains how a pragmatic method of evaluating tax policy questions
might operate to improve analysis of fairness issues in the tax discourse.9
Under a pragmatic analysis, for instance, fairness principles are not dismissed as "merely political," "fuzzy" or "cognitively meaningless." On
the contrary, pragmatism shows that fairness principles can be just as
"valid" as the result of scientific investigations, including quasi-scientific
investigations such as utilitarian or econometric modeling. Pragmatism,
absolute truth in order to make room ... for humanized
in short, "denies
0
morality."
This article takes a pragmatic approach in that it shows the usefulness of denying absolute truth in discussions of fairness in tax law. At a
broader level, it also shows the usefulness of dropping philosophical
concerns over the truth status of fairness claims altogether. In this way it
echoes the pragmatist call to pay less attention to "the problems of philosophers" and more attention to "the problems of men."" In place of an
absolutist or foundationalist view of truth, pragmatism takes a more holistic approach, evaluating a principle of fairness by reflecting on its coherence with our other principles and practical goals. Thus, pragmatism
takes a big tent approach, bringing all considerations into play, including
distributive justice as well as efficiency considerations. This big tent
approach is clearly an established tradition in tax policy scholarship.
Nevertheless, its free-floating, foundationless character may make some
scholars feel that it is mushy, fuzzy or somehow nonrigorous. They may
feel more comfortable with a more formalistic form of analysis, with just
assuming a stock principle of fairness and plugging it into a neat analytical model. Under this formalist approach, principles of fairness or distributive justice operate in the same way that empirical facts or data operate in the natural sciences.'" This article argues that applying the prag9. There are (to say the least) significant variations within the pragmatist tradition. Contenporary pragmatists Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam, for instance, have very different views of truth
and rationality. Compare HILARY PUTNAM, REAUSM WITH A HuMAN FACE 19-26 (James Conant
ed., 1990) (describing how Rorty's position differs from his), with Richard Rorty, Putnam and the
Relativist Menace, 90 J. PHIL 443, 458 (1993) (asserting that he and Putnam are in the "same line of
business"). In addition, pragmatists have different attitudes regarding the scientific method. See KAI
NIELSEN, NATURAuSM WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS 32 (1996) ('l[f we get more precise [about the
pragmatist scientific method] we discover that there is no such a thing as the scientific method but a
cluster of different methods developed by various scientific disciplines for their various purposes
and answering to their often quite different interests."); 5 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COUCTED
PAPERS 50-72 (Charles Hartshome & Paul Weiss eds., 1960) (aligning pragmatism with the scientific method). See generally ARTHUR 0. LOVEJOY, THE THIRTEEN PRAGMATISMS AND oTHER
ESSAYS 1-29 (1963) (analyzing pragmatism as a loose collection of conflicting philosophies).
10. Goodman, supranote 7, at 8.
II. JOHN DEWEY, The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, in 10 JOHN DEWEY: THE MIDDLE
WORKS, 1899-1924 at 3, 46 (Jo Anne Boydston ed., 1980).
12. For a (much, much) more detailed account of the relationship between scientific approaches and social policy questions, see THOMAS A. MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL THEORY OF
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matist approach is not only philosophically defensible but in many cases
more useful than formalist models in analyzing core tax policy issues.
Accordingly, this article compares formalism to pragmatism in two areas
of tax policy debate: the progressivity debate and the consumption tax
debate. In addition, this article compares the pragmatist approach to
some relatively recent attempts to take fairness issues seriously by applying explicit theories of justice developed by philosophers such as John
Rawls or Ronald Dworkin. In both cases, this article shows that the
pragmatic tradition is superior to both formalism and explicitly philosophical theories of justice in that it: (1) avoids analytical errors inherent
in stuffing fairness analysis into a formalist paradigm and (2) provides a
philosophical justification for tax scholars to examine fairness issues by
their own lights without a Ph.D. in philosophy.
This article proceeds in the following manner. Part H describes the
methodological strategy of the tax policy discourse at its most general
level, identifying economic analysis as the master trope and examining
how its rigid dichotomy between efficiency and fairness issues might
discourage rigorous discussion of fairness issues." Part II rejects the
view, associated with critical legal scholarship, that economic analysis is,
as a theoretical or ideological matter, inherently dismissive of fairness
concerns or automatically supportive of the status quo. Part II acknowledges, however, that the sociological phenomenon of tax scholars in law
schools "playing economists" may result in permanent deferral of fairness concerns even where, as in law schools, addressing such concerns
would seem to be particularly appropriate. Part III describes in greater
detail the formalist strategy for addressing fairness questions in the contemporary tax policy discourse, focusing on actual articulations in the
two most important historical debates in tax policy: the consumption tax
debate and the progressivity debate. As Part I shows, the formalist
strategy is based on a foundationalist view of knowledge, the idea that
the only legitimate knowledge is knowledge that is objectively grounded
in something outside our historically and culturally contingent traditions
and beliefs. The foundationalist orientation sees a formalist plugging in
of stock fairness principles into models as the best we can possibly hope
to do if we want to examine fairness claims. As Part II demonstrates,
some tax scholarship even resists analysis of fairness principles altogether as a result of foundationalist preoccupations, marginalizing fairness principles on the philosophical level as unscientific, "'cognitively
meaningless' 'pseudostatements"' about which real knowledge is impossible." Part III rejects this foundationalism as philosophically problem-

HABERMAS 137-149 (1978) (summarizing Habermas's critique of attempts to use natural
science methods in the social sciences).
13. As explained below, the methodology of economic analysis is defined as the application of
the equity/efficiency dichotomy, which separates economic efficiency issues into separate baskets.
14. Goodman, supra note 7, at 8. The most this treatment of fairness claims can do is ask how
the tax system stacks up against a posited (but not independently evaluated) fairness principle as in
JURGEN
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atic and therefore regards the resulting formalism as unnecessary. Part II
offers a nonfoundationalist, pragmatic approach that questions the need
for objectivity in the first place by showing how we can analyze fairness
issues by our best lights, seeing how we get on without any foundational
guides or grand theories to point us in the "right" direction. Thus, Part III
also distinguishes the pragmatic approach from the approaches of recent
tax scholarship that use comprehensive philosophical doctrine to provide
an overarching theory to adjudicate fairness and distributive justice
claims. Specifically, Parts III and IV raise the question of whether such

master theories relying on "reasonableness" (Rawls)" or "integrity"
(Dworkin)" are necessary or even useful for serious examination of fairness in tax policy. To defend the pragmatic tradition in tax policy, Part
IV questions the usefulness of recent attempts to rationalize tax policy
analysis along the lines suggested by Dworkin and Rawls, by contrasting
them with the nonfoundationalist/pragmatic approach that eschews overarching theory for a more ad hoc, provisional, and local form of analysis.
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
More than any other identifiable method, economic analysis frames
tax policy analysis at every level. Even in an introductory tax law course,
some understanding of, for instance, deferral and deadweight loss' is
important for understanding doctrine and policy. In more specialized
forums, economic analysis often predominates;" every issue is broken
down into two discrete and presumably manageable tasks, answering

the formulation, "Given (fairness) principle X, our tax system is (or is not) desirable." In viewing
this formalism as derivative of an underlying foundationalism, the diagnosis (and remedy) of this
article is different than other recent accounts of formalism in tax policy analysis. Cf., e.g., McCaffery, supra note i, at 75-76 (taking a "political-interpretive" approach to tax analysis).
15. See William D. Andrews, Fairnessand the Choice Between a Consunption-Type and an
Accretion-Type Personal Income Tax: A Reply to ProfessorWarren, 88 HARV. L. REV 947, 950 &
n.10 (1975) (using Rawls); McCaffery, supra note 1,at 83, 88-89 (using Rawls).
16. See McCaffery, supranote 1,at 82-83 (using Dworkin).
17. See, e.g., WILLiAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION 112-15
(11 th ed. 1997) (discussing deferral); HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 328-33 (4th ed. 1995)
(describing deadweight loss).
18. As previously noted, the tax policy discourse assimilated economic analysis well before
the law and economics movement made economic concepts so familiar in other areas of the law. See
supranote 4 and accompanying text. Indeed, it is fair to say that economic analysis is so much a part
of the traditional approaches to tax policy that it hardly even represents an interdisciplinary approach
at all, as it might when it occurs in torts, property, criminal law, contracts, or constitutional law. Cf.,
e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View ofthe Cathedral,85 HARv.L. REV. 1089 (1972) (property); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE LJ. 1261 (1980)
(contracts); William M.Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD.325 (1989) (copyright); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory ofthe CriminalLaw,
85 COLUM. L.REV. 1193 (1985) (criminal law); Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis
of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994) (torts).
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questions of efficiency and questions of fairness.'9 Use of the equity/efficiency dichotomy raises two issues affecting the treatment of
fairness in the tax policy discourse. First, it raises the specter of "law and
economics," the use of which in other areas of the law has been sharply
criticized as an ideology which distorts analysis of fairness. Second, it
raises the practical question of whether tax scholars in the legal academy
can safely adopt economic analysis without being redundant or derivative given the work of their colleagues in the economics departments.
This Part argues that if there is a problem with using economic analysis
in tax policy it is a practical rather than an ideological one.
It is worth considering therefore, even at a general level, a basic critique of law and economics as ideology to distinguish it from the practical critique favored in this Part. The point of this exercise is to distinguish the pragmatic orientation from ideology critique or critical legal
theory in general. While pragmatism and critical legal theory share a
skepticism about objective truth and ultimate foundations, the type of
pragmatism offered sees little use in the term "ideology" and is much
more accommodating in using all available modes of analysis-including
economic analysis-if it gets us an acceptable answer. To distinguish
pragmatism from critical theory, then, it is useful to examine critical theory's criticism of economic analysis more closely.
Consider, for instance, the claim that economic analysis is a conservative ideology." Under this critique, economic analysis asserts highly
dubious (usually conservative) normative claims while seeming to engage in objective, scientific reasoning.2 An analysis supporting such a
conclusion might take the following line. Economic analysis purports to
tell us what legal rule is desirable by determining whether it maximizes
aggregate utility. The tool of measurement it uses is the utilitarian calculus, where each person's utility is measured to determine maximum
aggregate utility." One problem for normative economic analysis, however, is that measuring an individual's subjective utility is a nearly im19. Thus, to evaluate comprehensively the policy effects of a tax rule, tax scholars generally
take the off-the-shelf methodology of public finance economics, separating and balancing efficiency
and equity effects. Cf., e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 13, 95-96 (4th ed. 1984); PAuL SAMUEISON, MACROECONOMICS 23 (15th
ed. 1997); Nohel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Casefor a CapitalGains Preference,
48 TAx L REV. 319,366-67 & n.207 (1993).
20. For examples of critiques of law and economics in the legal literature, see C. Edwin Baker,
The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL.& PuB. AW.3 (1975); Morton J.Horwitz,
Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 905 (1980); Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, ProductionTheory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL L. REV. 669
(1979); Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L.
REV. 451 (1974). For the leading examination of ideology critique and critical theory in philosophy
(in English), see RAYMOND GEuss, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY 4-26 (1981) (examining the
claims of the Frankfurt School's critical theory).
21. See Leff, supranote 20,at451-82.
22. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 571-73 (3d ed.
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possible task. Thus, economic analysis often takes a shortcut, relying on
objective manifestations of individual preference, such as monetary
wealth. Ideology critique can focus on this compromise, characterizing it
as a distortion that excludes nomnonetary expressions of value. Under
this critique, using price as the measure of efficiency excludes, for instance, the value that poor people would place on commodities if they
had the means (i.e., the money) to express such value, as well as any
subjective utility we might get from realizing our egalitarian impulses.
An ideology critique could claim that excluding powerless voices or
nonmonetized values from the analysis makes an implicit value judgment
that these voices and values are not worth counting." Accordingly, under
this critique, when economic analysis measures the desirability of a legal
rule using a utilitarian calculus with a monetized domain set, it not only
gets it wrong, but gets it wrong in a politically incorrect manner.
The problem with ideology critique is that it impugns economic
analysis per se, throwing the baby out with the bathwater. If one recognizes the limitations of economic analysis, it can be used quite successfully. Tweak economic analysis a bit, for instance, and the philosophical
problems lessen. This is, in fact, what tax scholars implicitly do already.
Economic analysis in tax law either explicitly modifies the utilitarian
model to account for these problems or recognizes its limitations by the
constant disclaimer that fairness considerations might change the results.
For instance, while economic analysis in tax law does use price as a
measure of utility, it generally does so by taking into account the different value of dollars to taxpayers of differing wealth by assuming a declining marginal utility of income.' Far from supporting conservative
political programs, economic analyses with declining marginal utility
assumptions have historically been used to justify a progressive income
tax structure.' Furthermore, even assuming that measuring preferences
only in dollars (even with declining marginal utility assumptions) excludes important values, economic analysis has an out. By its own terms,

23. For example, the claim is that if a poor person has only one dollar to spend on bread, it is
misleading to say that when the poor person offers one dollar, that poor person values the bread less
than the rich person who offers (and can pay) two. Thus, under this critique, economic analysis errs
when it asserts that forcing the baker to sell the bread to the poor person for one dollar is inefficient
in any meaningful sense of decreasing aggregate utility. See Leff, supra note 20, at 478-79 & n.77.
24. See, e.g., HAROLD M. GROVES, TAX PHLXSOPHERS 29-30, 61-62 (Donald J. Curran ed.,
1974).
25. See, e.g., Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Casefor ProgressiveTaxation,
19 U. CMt. L. REV. 417,456-58 (1952), reprintedin WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE
UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 40-42 (Phoenix Books 1963) (1953) (noting the importance of the concept of marginal utility in justifying progressivity); Joseph Bankman & Thomas
Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L
REV. 1905, 1947 (1987) (assuming a reasonable degree of declining marginal utility in applying an
optimal taxation model to support moderate progressivity).
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economic analysis requires a further inquiry after the determination of
the economic efficiency effects; one must ask, "But is it fair? ' "s
The point of this brief excursion into economic analysis is to distinguish critical theory from pragmatic theory, two approaches which often
share a nonfoundationalist orientation. From a pragmatic perspective,
economic analysis, like any other analytical tool, is quite useful as long
as we remain aware of its limitations. Thus, pragmatic analysis, consistent with the big tent metaphor and in contrast to ideology critique, welcomes economic analysis as one tool among many. The tool has its defects as well as its strengths. One defect is that economic analysis, while
it does not foreclose rich analysis of fairness issues, does not exactly
encourage it either. The prevalence of economic analysis might cause the
tax scholar to feel comfortable sticking to efficiency considerations and
deferring discussion of fairness issues altogether through a formalist
mode of analysis where principles of fairness are stuck in as going assumptions. The question then arises, "Who will pick up the slack?" 7
Adoption of a purely economic mode of analysis also threatens to
make tax scholarship redundant and derivative.' It places the tax scholar
in direct competition with economists. This is not a level playing field.
Economists safely use economic analysis to exploit the benefits of spe26. See, e.g., PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 22, at 570-73 (describing equity/efficiency
effects); AMARTYA K. SEN, CODLLECTVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 22 (1970) (noting that it is
efficient, but not fair, to let Nero fiddle while Rome bums). The fact that the tax discourse imported
economic analysis directly from public finance economics, and not from proponents within the law
and economics movement per se, may help account for why tax policy analysis can resist critiques of
economic analysis. Tax scholars (like public finance economists) do not typically make overarching
reductive claims that, for example, tax law is only about maximizing a narrow category of efficiency
or that maximizing wealth is the only criterion to evaluate a tax rule. Cf., e.g., Richard A. Posner,
Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE
W. RES. L.REV. 179, 185 (1987) ("'The common law seeks to promote efficiency in the sense of
wealth maximization ....");
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, IJ.LEGAL STUD. 29, 33
(1972) (asserting that "profit-maximizing" is the engine of innovation in the common law). To the
extent tax policy analysis avoids such ambitious uses of economic analysis, it may avoid the criticisms of economic analysis generally. See, e.g., Cento G. Veljanovski, Wealth Maximization, Law
and Ethics--On the Limits of Economic Efficiency, I INT'L REV. L.& ECON. 5, 22-23 (1981) (stating that Pomer's wealth maximization principle does not acceptably address ethics or rights).
27. As stated by Posner
Economics does not answer the question whether the existing distribution of income and
wealth is good or bad, just or unjust ....Nor can the economist tell us whether... consumer satisfaction should be the dominant value of society. Thus, the economist's competence in a discussion of the legal system is limited. He can predict the effect of legal
rules on value and efficiency, in their strict technical senses, and on the existing distribution of income and wealth, but he cannot issue mandatory prescriptions for social change.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15 (5th ed. 1998). Economists regularly defer
on fairness issues by either using simplifying assumptions, such as equal distribution, or by a selfimposed division of labor, characterizing fairness concerns as the domain of philosophers and politicians but not economists. See generally DEIRDRE N. MCCLosKEY, THE VICES OF ECONOMISTS: THE
VIRTUES OF THE BOURGEOISIE (1996) (describing formalism in economics and criticizing neoclassical economics for abandoning its ethical roots).
28. See Livingston, supra note 6, at 374 ("If tax policy is economic in nature.... why do we
need any lawyers?').
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cialization. They provide economic models for examining the economic
efficiency effects of a tax rule, but leave others to grapple with equity
determinations. It might be suggested that examination of such issues
should be left to the political process, that tax scholars have no business
imposing their own views into the analysis. But this separation of the
"political" from the "scholarly" is just what this article questions. There
is no reason to think that any analysis is apolitical or objective. Accordingly, it is a mistake to strive for neutrality on such issues. On the contary, there are good reasons for encouraging tax scholars to enter the
political debates. First, it might improve the level of analyses in circulation, thus improving the broader public policy discourse. Second, thinking about politics might encourage tax scholars to examine the political
process. Similarly, a pragmatic approach encourages a broad range of
topics and approaches in tax scholarship.

ImI. EQuITY ANALYSIS
This Part critically examines the way in which the tax policy discourse traditionally treats fairness claims. As shown below, the dominant
strain in the discourse is to analyze tax equity by listing core, stock principles of fairness and determining whether the tax proposal in question
supports or undermines the chosen principle. In this strain, fairness principles are asserted rather than independently examined, used as the foundational starting point of inquiry rather than conclusions of reasoned
analysis. This point has been made elsewhere.' This article, however,
moves beyond identifying formalism to explaining and remedying it. To
these ends, this Part connects formalist analysis of fairness in tax policy
to the foundationalist tradition in philosophical ethics." In this tradition,
29. See Barbara H. Fried, Fairnessand the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961,964-65,
1015 (1992) (analyzing fairness principles that am presumed without analysis in the literature);
McCaffery, supranote 1,at 86.
30. In this tradition, the great hope of ethical philosophy is to explain how ethical claims can
be "objective" in the sense "of a kind consistent with a respectable resolution of a range of issues--epistemological, metaphysical, semanti--that in philosophical common sense are characteristically bundled together in the idea of objectivity." Stephen Darwall et al., Toward Fin de siecle
Ethics: Some Trends, in MORAL DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES 3,
37 n.29 (Stephen Darwall et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter MORAL DISCOURSE]. This article views this
tradition as foundationalist and encourages the tax policy discourse to abandon the goal of "respectable resolutions" to the problem of objectivity and instead focus on more provisional, ad hoc, and
contingent resolutions to issues of fairness.
A note on terminology is appropriate here since "foundationalism" is used in the philosophical discourse in different ways. Similar to the definition used in this article, the foundationalist
approach has been described as an attempt "to ground inquiry and communication in something
more firm and stable than mere belief or unexamined practice. The foundationalist strategy is first to
identify that ground and then so to order our activities that they become anchored to it and are
thereby rendered objective and principled." STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY:
CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 342 (1989).

"Foundationalism" has also been used to denote a form of empiricism, asserting that all knowledge
is derived fron certain basic sensory givens whose truth is immediately evident and indubitable. See
NIELSEN, supra note 9, at 29. The foundationalist tradition in philosophy has been contrasted to
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fairness claims must be grounded in objective reality, or something like
it, to merit assent." This Part identifies these foundationalist strains in the
formalist tradition in tax policy, connecting formalist treatments with the
foundationalist view that fairness claims are mere expressions of personal preference not subject to rational analysis (because they lack objective grounding).!' This Part makes clear that other nonfoundationalist
philosophical views are not only possible but might be better at giving
rigorous analysis of fairness claims a respectable philosophical pedigree.
Accordingly, this Part offers nonfoundationalist pragmatism as an alternative approach not only to the dominant foundationalist strategy of rejecting fairness principles as meaningless but also to the constructivist
strategy (much more prevalent in the more recent interdisciplinary lit-

"naturalism," which describes knowledge as arising from reliable processes (causes) rather than
being derived from basic premises. As one commentator puts it
Modem epistemology has been largely dominated by positions which can be characterized as "foundationalist": all knowledge is seen as ultimately grounded in certain foundational beliefs which have an epistemically privileged position-4hey are a priori or selfwarranting, incorrigible, or something of the sorL.... Recent work in "naturalistic epistemology" ... suggests that there are no beliefs which are epistemically privileged in the
way foundationalism seems to require.
Richard Boyd, How to Be a Moral Realist, in MORAL DISCOURSE, supra, at 105, 112-113. The
approach suggested in this article is closer to naturalistic than foundationalist epistemology, though
it seeks to avoid discussions of epistemology altogether. This, in turn, pushes this article's approach
closer to "natural language philosophy" which has its own critics. See id. at 116 (describing "philistine antiscientism often associated with 'ordinary language' philosophy"). The foundationalism in
the tax policy discourse identified in this article includes the empiricistlemotivist form that views
fairness claims as cognitively empty because they lack empirical foundation. See ALFRED JULES
AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 111 (1952). It also includes attempts to ground moral knowledge in universal reason. See, e.g., Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, in MORAL
DISCOURSE, supra, at 389, 393, 399 (discussing Kant's grounding of the moral law in human autonomy and deriving a universal obligation to others from this fact).
31. See Darwall et al., supra note 30, at 7. It is of course well beyond the scope of this article
to catalogue the tremendous variety of sub-schools within philosophical ethics. See generally Peter
Railton, Moral Realism, in MORAL DISCOURSE, supra note 30, at 137-38 (listing 13 different forms
of moral realism alone). The point is simply to identify the quest for foundations in much philosophical theory.
32. This article views such formalist treatments as one response to the foundationalist problematic: since fairness claims are not verifiable by facts in the world, they are utterly lacking in any
cognitive content and are meaningless. A nonfoundationalist account of fairness claims would recognize that fairness principles are not verified by facts in the world but, and here is the difference, it
would not deem fairness evaluations as lower on the totem pole of knowledge. Nonfoundationalism,
in other words, rejects the fact/value distinction in ethics:
To frame a theory of knowledge which makes it necessary to deny the validity of moral
ideas, or else to refer them to some other and separate kind of universe from that of
common sense and science, is both provincial and arbitray. The pragmatist has at least
tried to face, and not to dodge, the question of how it is that moral and scientific "knowledge" can both hold of one and the same world. And whatever the difficulties in his proffered solution, the conception that scientific judgments are to be assimilated to moral is
closer to common sense than is the theory that validity is to be denied of moral judgments
because they do not square with the preconceived theory of the nature of the world to
which scientific judgments must refer.
John Dewey, Does Reality Possess PracticalCharacter?, in PRAGMATISM: A CONTEMPORARY
READER, supra note 7, at 79, 83. For a more detailed critique of foundationalism in philosophy, see
KAI NIELSEN, ON TRANSFORMING PHLOSOPttY: A METAPHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY (1995).
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erature relying on Rawls and Dworkin) of establishing a solid basis for
fairness claims by grounding them in idealized notions of reasonableness
or integrity.
The remainder of this Part contrasts the use of the foundationalist/formalist strategy with the use of the nonfoundationalist pragmatic
strategy in the two areas of tax policy where questions of fairness are
paramount: the consumption tax and progressivity debates. It shows how
the analysis of principles in these areas under the nonfoundationalist
pragmatic approach, free from a concern over objective foundations, can
legitimate rigorous discussion of fairness claims.
A. The Consumption Tax Debate
The consumption tax debate concerns whether it is desirable from
an efficiency and fairness standpoint to change the tax base from an income tax base to a consumption tax base. Generally speaking, an income
tax taxes aggregate increases in wealth regardless of whether such wealth
is consumed or merely accumulated.33 . A consumption tax, by contrast, is
generally thought to tax only wealth that is consumed for personal purposes and to exempt savings.' A pure consumption tax has traditionally
been understood as the equivalent of a tax on wages alone, leaving the
income from savings and investment collected tax free.3 Put in these
terms, it is not surprising that fairness questions have historically been
paramount in the consumption tax debate.
The obvious pragmatic approach to the consumption tax debate is to
make as clear as possible the distributive and productivity effects of
switching to a consumption tax, line them up with our varied, sometimes
competing notions of the good, and balance the information to reach
some reasonable agreement or equilibrium. Indeed, the tax policy discourse has a rich pragmatic tradition in the debate. The purpose of this
section is to provide a solid philosophical basis for that tradition and to
33. Our current system of income tax is, of course, a hybrid system because it defers taxation
on a substantial amount of annual wealth accumulation. See Henry J. Aaron et al., Introduction to
UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPrION TAx 1, 3

(Henry J. Aaron

et al. eds., 1988) (discussing the United States' hybrid system); David F. Levy, Towards Equal Tax
Treatment of Economically Equivalent FinancialInstruments: Proposalsfor Taxing Prepaid Forward Contracts, Equity Swaps, and Certain ContingentDebt Instruments, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 471,
474-75 (1997) (discussing the use of derivatives to postpone recognition); Edward J. McCaffery,
Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1145, 1152-55 (1992)
(examining the United States' hybrid system).
34. This understanding, however, must be qualified because a consumption tax does tax elements of saving in the same way as an income tax. See Joseph Bankman & Barbara H. Fried, Winners andLosers in the Shift to a Consumption Tax, 86 GEO.LJ. 539, 541-42 (1998).
35. See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87
HARv. L. REv. 1113, 1126 (1974); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairnessand a Consumption-Type or Cash
Flow PersonalIncome Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931, 938 (1975). 'bis equivalence does not hold,
however, since a consumption tax does tax elements of savings. See Bankman & Fried, supra note
34, at 541-42.
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raise the philosophical problems with the alternative, formalist tradition
in the discourse. Under the formalist tradition, the consumption tax is
tested to see if it reflects a given foundational principle. This section
examines the use of four such principles to highlight the problems of
formalist analysis. These principles are: (1) the endowments tax principle, (2) the Hobbesian benefits principle, (3) the perfected income tax
principle, and (4) the nondiscrimination principle. Historically, these
principles often operated in the tax policy debate as grounding principles.
Under the formalist use of these principles, the consumption tax is legitimate if it accurately reflects the chosen foundational principle. This
mode of analysis is limited in that it fails to recognize that there is no one
norm that legitimates our tax system but rather a multitude of competing
and conflicting norms that tax policy must grapple with. Furthermore,
mere matching of tax system to stock principle may hamper evaluation
of the system by creating a false sense of analytical progress on fairness
issues when in fact it is just recycling stock principles. The persistence of
the formalist tradition can best be explained by the resilience of the
foundationalist view that without objective grounding, knowledge is impossible; that without grounding principles, analysis is merely fuzzy
contextualism. The point of this article is to delete the word "merely" in
front of "fuzzy contextualism." This section argues that abandoning this
formalist heritage for the more pragmatic orientation is both philosophically defensible and quite useful for making explicit the connection between tax policy and the good life.
1. The Endowments Tax Principle
One foundational principle used to evaluate the fairness of the consumption tax regime is the endowments tax principle. Under the endowments tax principle, tax burdens should be proportional with initial endowments (in terms of initial financial and human capital). ' Under this
notion of fairness, two taxpayers with the same potential income stream
should be taxed equally regardless of what they choose to do with their
endowments." Thus, two taxpayers with equal ex ante earning power and
financial capital should, under this principle, face the same tax burden
regardless of whether they save their earnings and capital or spend it on
consumption. Such taxpayers should face the same tax burden even if
one taxpayer in fact earns more than the other taxpayer. An income tax
violates the endowments principle because it taxes people differently
according to what they actually do with their endowments. Specifically,
assuming people maximize their endowments, an income tax discrimi-

36. See DAVID F. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX PoucY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC
TAX REFORM 36-38 (2d ed. rev. 1984); DON FU.ERTON & DIANE LIM ROGERS, WHO BEARS THE
LIFETIME TAX BURDEN? 22-23 (1993).
37. DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 315 (1986), discussed in Fried,
supra note 29, at 997-98 & nn.99-102.
38. See Fried, supra note 29, at 997-98.
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nates against ex post savers, even when these individuals have the same
ex ante endowments as their spender counterparts. A consumption tax,
by removing this disparity between those who choose to spend and those
who choose to save, is thus a more equitable tax under the endowments
tax argument because it eliminates this ex post discrimination."
Analyses under the endowments principle generally do not focus on
why taxing people on their ex ante endowments should be considered
fair in the first place. In this regard, the analyses are highly formalistic,
assuming the appropriateness of the endowments principle and then deciphering which tax system best reflects that principle. The problem with
this approach, however, is that it begs the question of whether the endowments principle is legitimate. What is required for answering, or
even just posing correctly, the fairness question is an alternative analysis
that does more than merely plug in a principle as a core assumption, an
analysis that actually examines whether this assumption is justified. Even
asking this question, however, requires that one abandon the foundationalist view that fairness principles cannot be true or false, correct or incorrect in any meaningful sense. Put another way, it is only if one assumes
that one principle of fairness is just as good as another that plugging in
stock notions of fairness is satisfactory. The formalist use of the endow39. A simple example demonstrates how an income tax, which taxes earnings as well as the
accrual on saved earnings, is said to increase the effective tax rate on those who save versus those
who immediately consume, given certain assumptions. See id. at 963-64. But see Bankman & Fried,
supra note 34. Two taxpayers, Profligate and Thrifty, each earn $100 in wage income. Profligate
spends the $100 in the year earned, while Thrifty saves the $100 for 14 years. In a no-tax world, in
14 years, with a 5% compounded interest rate, Thrifty will have $200 saved. Thus, in a no-tax world,
Thrifty will have twice as much to spend as Profligate. With an income tax of 40%, however, Thrifty
must pay tax on the initial $100 in the year earned, as well as paying tax on the interest as it accrues
in the following years. The result is that Thrifty will only have $91 for consumption, instead of $200
for consumption at the end of the 14th year. Profligate, under a 40% income tax will have $60 to
spend as he pleases in the year earned. The net result of the income tax is that Thrifty has only about
50% more than Profligate as opposed to twice as much in a no-tax world. Put another way, savers
pay a greater present value tax than equivalently situated spenders.
Under a consumption tax, by contrast, Thrifty is placed in an equal after-tax position relative
to Profligate. Under a 40% consumption tax, Profligate will still have $60 to spend as he pleases in
the year earned. Thrifty, however, pays no initial tax on the $100 earned and saved, and will pay a
tax of $80 on the $200 she withdraws in year 14. Thus, Thrifty will have $120 in year 14 under a
consumption tax, rather than the $91 she would enjoy under an income tax. Comparing Thrifty's and
Profligate's relative positions under a consumption tax and a no-tax world, they are in identical
relative positions since Thrifty will still enjoy twice as much income as Profligate under a consumption tax regime. See id. at 963-64. For similar examples, see Andrews, supra note 35, at 1121;
IRVING FISHER, THE NATURE OF CAPITAL AND INCOME 249-53 (1906); Warren, supra note 35, at
934-36. In this way, the consumption tax is said to preserve the relative benefits of saving in a notax world and to leave taxpayers indifferent (from a tax perspective) between saving and spending
once a consumption tax is imposed. Another way to view the endowments principle as supporting a
consumption tax is to view the consumption tax "as the closest practical approach to the [endowments principle] ideal" since a cash-flow consumption tax is traditionally understood the functional
equivalent of a tax on wages as earned. Lawrence Zelenak, The Reification of Metaphor: Income
Taxes, Consumption Taxes and Human Capital,51 TAX L. REV. 1, 3 n.17 (1995). But see Bankman
& Fried,supra note 34.

1998]

ANALYZING FAIRNESS PRINCIPLES IN TAX POLICY

169

ments principle in the tax policy discourse gets its legitimacy from this
background foundationalism. A nonfoundationalist, pragmatic strategy
that views principles of fairness as being as susceptible to truth determinations as statements in the harder sciences would never have plugged an
unexamined endowments principle in a formalist model. Instead, it
would have first evaluated the endowments principle to see if it made
sense.
Indeed, even a preliminary analysis under a nonfoundationalist
strategy indicates significant problems with the endowments principle.
For instance, the endowments principle seems to advocate a lottery
method of taxation. To make this clearer, consider a group of 1000 taxpayers. A computer randomly assigns to each person a number from one
to 1000. These numbers represent endowments, with 1000 representing
the greatest endowment and one representing the lowest. The endowments principle requires taxing this group of 1000 in proportion to their
randomly assigned endowments. At a 30% rate, the person who drew
1000 would have a tax burden of 1000 x 30% or 300. The person who
drew 10, however, would have a tax burden of only 3.
The interesting question that formalist uses of the endowments principle misses, and that can only be raised and not fully argued here, is
whether such a lottery system of taxation makes any sense. Put another
way: Why should the person who draws 1000 face a heavier tax burden
merely because the computer assigned her this number? The endowments principle fails to explain why the tax burden should be heavier on
those who, by luck of the genetic draw for instance, have the mere capacity to earn Michael Jordan salaries. As a principle of justice, this arbitrariness casts doubt on the endowments tax principle as a grounding
norm for a fair tax system.' On the contrary, implementation of a system
based only on the endowments principle would seem to violate fairness
in many cases. This is because it would impose unduly harsh tax burdens
on those who choose not to maximize the value of their endowments in
the market. Accordingly, the endowments principle acts as a moral imperative that people should be forced to maximize the market value of
their talents. This would be at least a controversial moral position. It
would punish those who chose, for instance, to donate their labor to public service rather than sell it to the NBA. Libertarians would object that
people should be free to undervalue their potential according to their own
personal preferences without regulatory penalty.! In addition, the en-

40. See Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE U. 259, 276
(1983) (describing the arbitrariness of the benefits of birth and genetics).
41. It may be possible to implement an endowment tax in a manner that would mitigate this
and other problems. See Alan Gunn, The Case for an Income Tax, 46 U. COi. L. REV. 370, 381-82,
399-400 (1979) (raising libertarian concerns); Kaplow, supra note 6, at 1507-12 (acknowledging
libertarian objections to ex ante taxation of endowments and developing a proxy system which
would tax actual earnings while still approximating the endowment ideal); Alvin Warren, Would a
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dowments tax principle conflicts with the notion that the tax burden
should bear some relation to whether one deserves her actual income.
Under an endowments tax, persons who realize wealth in excess of their
ex ante endowments, through windfall gains for instance, would be rewarded through an exemption for such windfall gains!' Furthermore, the
endowments principle entirely ignores end-state concerns about the tax
system's effect on overall social welfare, thus possibly conflicting with
utilitarian views of the good. The point here is not to refute the endowments principle but to show what the formalist/foundationalist approach
misses and perhaps obscures and what a nonfoundationalist pragmatic
analysis opens up.
2. The Hobbesian Benefits Principle
Another fairness principle that has been used in the consumption tax
debates in a formalist manner is the Hobbesian benefits principle. Under
this principle, one should be taxed only to the extent one removes resources from the common social pool. ' The Hobbesian benefits principle
is said to justify a consumption tax because a consumption tax taxes in
proportion to what an individual takes out of the common pool." An income tax is unfair under the Hobbesian benefits principle because it
taxes savers more than identically situated spenders, thereby penalizing
those who contribute to the common pool. Thus, a consumption tax
which taxes savers and spenders equally is said to be more equitable under the Hobbesian benefits principle.
The use of the Hobbesian benefits principle in the tax policy discourse is of particular interest because it represents the second species of
foundationalism criticized in this article. This second species brings
master theories of distributive justice to solve fairness problems. Since
the pragmatic approach advocated in this article rejects both formalism
and the use of full-fledged theories of justice as foundations for fairness
principles, it is useful to examine an example of the latter in William D.
Andrews's 1974 article, A Consumption-Type Or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax.'5 The article's call for a consumption tax* on fairness
grounds sparked a debate more than twenty years ago that still preoccu-

Consumption Tax Be FairerThan an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.. 1081, 1114 (1980) (voicing concern about the effect an earning capacity tax would have on individual liberty).
42. SeeFried, supranote29, at 1011-12.
43. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: PARTS I AND 11 at 271 (Liberal Arts Press 1958) (1651).
44. Id. ("For what reason is there that he which labors much and, sparing the fruits of his
labor, consumes little should be more charged than he that, living idly, gets little and spends all he
gets, seeing the one has no more protection from the commonwealth than the other?"). For modem
treatments of this view, see CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 147-50 (1978); NICHOLAS
KALDOR, AN EXPENDIURE TAX 53 (4th impression 1965).
45. Andrews, supra note 35.
46. Seeid.at1122.
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pies the discourse.' Andrews makes two clusters of arguments for a consumption tax. In the first cluster are administrability, simplicity, distributive, and perfected income tax arguments. 4 In the second cluster is an
argument for fairness based on the Hobbesian benefits principle. '
Andrews discusses the first cluster through a straightforward analysis much like the one advocated in this article. For instance, the distributive effects of a flat consumption tax are considered undesirable by Andrews, and thus, he adds progressivity and a strengthened estate and gift
tax element to ensure distributive equity." Andrews also questions how
well the actual income tax lives up to its own ideal of taxing annual increases in -wealth and suggests that the current system is too broken to
fix, and that switching to a consumption tax might be better than tinkering with the broken system." Still within the first cluster, Andrews
evaluates the effect of a consumption tax on simplicity and administrability, describing in detail the complexities of current law in contrast to
the relative simplicity of the cash-flow model of consumption taxation he
supports.'
It is within the second cluster of arguments, explicitly addressing
the fairness issues, that Andrews' methodological commitments become
clearer. Andrews repeatedly endorses the consumption tax as more fair

than an income/accretion tax. 3 Surprisingly, Andrews offers little to justify this central fairness claim. Andrews does cite the Hobbesian princi-

ple as an appealing intuition, quoting Hobbes for the principle that accumulation, the excess of what has been contributed to public production,
should not be taxed.' What is interesting is Andrews' discussion (really,

off-the-cuff ruminations) about the status of the fairness claim and
47. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 35, at 931 (examining whether, as Andrews contends, a
consumption tax is fairer than an accretion-type tax). But see William D. Andrews, Fairnessand the
PersonalIncome Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARv.L. REV. 947 (1975) (arguing that a
consumption tax is fairer than an accretion-type tax).
48. Andrews, supranote 35, at 1150-65.
49. Id. at 1164-67.
50. See id. at 1172. Andrews also argues that the present income tax has done little to redress
actual distributive discrepancies as an empirical matter, and notes that a progressive consumption
tax, supplemented with strengthened estate and gift taxes is the equivalent of a progressive income
tax so supplemented since, in both cases, both accretion and accumulation are taxed. id. Andrews
prefers a consumption tax so modified, however, because it is less complex to administer than a
supplemented income tax. Id. at 1116-18.
51. For instance, Andrews points out how far our system is from a tre income tax since it
defers tax on pension savings and unrecognized capital appreciation. Id. at 1116-19. The modifications required to eliminate these and other discrepancies (through a market-to-market system for
instance) would create undue complexity and serious administrative problems according to Andrews.
Id.
52. See id.at 1148-65. Accordingly, he welcomes the fact that a cash-flow consumption tax
would render the complex reorganization provisions of the Internal Revenue Code obsolete. See id.
at 1152.
53. Andrews often adds persuasive force to his fairness assertion by claiming efficiency gains
in the same sentence. See id. at 1115, 1169.
54. Seeid.at 1121, 1165-67,1172.
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method. When Andrews first mentions the Hobbesian benefits principle,
he characterizes it as a "point of view." In his second mention he writes,
"[tio the extent accumulation exceeds deferred consumption it is indeed
consumption foregone, and the Hobbesian view ... is of considerable
validity in suggesting that accumulation should be exempted, at least
during the lifetime of the accumulator." 6 Thus, Andrews can be read as
thinking that the Hobbesian benefits principle is both a point of view and
capable of validity determinations. Accordingly, Andrews's strategy is
not merely the formalist/foundationalist strategy of viewing fairness
principles as personal preferences incapable of validity determinations.
Instead, he seems at least to allow for the possibility of a provisional type
of truth determination advocated by the nonfoundationalist pragmatic
account in this article.
Examining in greater detail Andrews' methodological approach,
however, reveals a distinction between his approach and the pragmatic
approach suggested in this article. Andrews is not a formalist, but he is
not a nonfoundationalist pragmatist either. He is somewhere in-between,
reaching out to explicit theories of justice as a foundation for fairness
claims. Andrews is something of a Rawlsian, which, from the perspective of this article, can be distinguished from nonfoundationalist pragmatism. As Andrews writes:
Matters of fairness are not generally subject to logical demonstration
from independent premises. All that reason can do is elaborate the
implications of plausible hypotheses in order to facilitate an informed
choice among them. What we need to do, therefore, is to examine the
matter from both equal-earner and equal-consumer perspectives, recognizing that each incorporates a certain assumption about how taxes
are to be distributed, and to reserve final judgment and choice between these assumptions until after the implications of both have
been explored."
While it is easy to see the similarities between this view and the
pragmatism advocated in this article, it is more interesting to emphasize
the differences in order to distinguish the ad hoc, judge-by-our-ownlights approach of this article from the self-consciously theoretical ap-,
proach that is gaining currency in the discourse. One aspect of this characterization of the Rawlsian strategy is particularly worth examiningthat it makes a distinction between the foundations of scientific
discourses (which operate from "independent premises") and the
foundations of ethical discourses. By placing fairness judgments in
relation to scientific judgments, this strategy problematizes the fairness

55.
56.
57.
(1971)).

See id. at 1166.
Id. at 172.
See Andrews, supra note 47, at 950 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTiCE 48-50
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discourse. It creates the need to provide the same foundation for ethical
claims as exists in the hard sciences. The task is to find a system of confirmation that will give fairness claims some objectivity. Andrews looks

to Rawls for such a system. It is therefore worth examining the possible
distinctions between Rawls's system and nonfoundationalist pragmatism.
The main difference between the pragmatic approach advocated in
this article and the Rawlsian project is that while pragmatism is motivated by a desire to get the job done, the Rawlsian constructivist project
(at least one version thereof) has the goal of establishing "moral objectivity" through obtaining "a suitably constructed social point of view that
all can accept." Thus, explicitly bringing Rawls into the analysis

through interdisciplinary work, using Rawls's system to evaluate fairness
claims, inevitably brings the purely philosophical problems of objectivity

and truth back into the tax policy discourse. The pragmatic approach, by
contrast, gives up on such problems altogether and urges policy analysts
to "just do it"" without worrying too much about the problems of philosophy.
The point is that we may not need philosophical theory to solve
these problems and may even be better off steering clear of it. Nevertheless, there are strong similarities between, for instance, Rawls's depiction
of ethical deliberation and the one in this article. Indeed, stripped of the
foundationalist concerns, Rawls could be reinterpreted as a pragmatist.
The similarity hinges (in part) on the account of "reflective equilibrium,"
where one balances all available principles and effects to reach an end
state of knowledge. ' The difference between Rawlsian reflective equilibrium and the ad hoc, provisional balancing of competing principles of the
pragmatic approach may just be one of degree. For instance, the prag-

58. See John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, in MORAL DISCOURSE, supra
note 30, at 247, 248. Obviously, this aspiration for universal acceptance is mor ambitious than the
provisional approach advocated in this article that views it as inevitable that some reasonable objections will apply to any particular fairness regime. The pragmatic approach rejects constructivist
requirements of "reasonableness" or universalizability as a priori constraints on acceptable justification. Such constraints can always be questioned as first principles by asking, for instance, Why
should I accept your definition of reasonableness?, and, Isn't defining reasonableness a priori (as,
for instance, requiring equal respect to one's interlocutors) just another way of defining what is fair?
59. See, e.g., Lynn Baker, "JustDo It": Pragmatismand ProgressiveSocial Change,78 VA.
L. REV. 697 (1992). The "just do it" phrase captures the low-brow temperament of the pragmatist
approach. As William James wrote:
This pragmatist talk about truths in the plural, about their utility and satisfactoriness,
about the success with which they "work," etc., suggests to the typical intellectualist
mind a sort of coarse lame second-rate makeshift article of truth. Such truths are not real
truth. Such tests are merely subjective. As against this, objective truth must be something
non-utilitarian, haughty, refined, remote, august, exalted. It must be an absolute conespondence of our thoughts with an equally absolute reality. It must be what we ought to
think unconditionally. The conditioned ways in which we do think are so much irrelevance
and matter for psychology. Down with psychology, up with logic, in all this question!
William James, Pragmatism,in PRAGMATISM: A CONThMPORARY READER, supranote 7, at 53,60-61.
60. For a more detailed account of reflective equilibrium, see NORMAN DANIELS, JUSTICE
AND JUSTIFICATON: REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 2 (1996).
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matic approach accepts fairness judgments as true or false at any point
along the continuum before maximum coherence is attained. By contrast,

achieving wide reflective equilibrium seems to require suspending judgment until end-state equilibrium is reached.6' For tax policy analysts,
requiring this type of analysis as a necessary precondition to commitment
to principles places moral knowledge too far out of reach.! Instead of
worrying about maximal coherence as a foundation for objectivity, the
pragmatic approach urges tax scholars to just get on as best they can.
Applying this provisional pragmatic approach to the Hobbesian
benefits principle then, one would ask some basic questions. First, even

assuming the Hobbesian benefits principle as the ground norm, using it
to justify exempting savings from taxation discounts the power and personal gain inherent with wealth accumulation,' even if the accumulation
also benefits the common pool.' After all, the owners of capital retain
property rights to such capital and can withdraw it at any time.r Second,
the Hobbesian benefits principle is only one principle among many.
Egalitarian tendencies, for instance, might require taxation of savings as
a means of increasing benefits to the poor. Thus while Andrews is right
that the Hobbesian principle is of considerable validity, it is best viewed
as one principle among many others in the mix, rather than a ground
norm. Furthermore, in embracing Rawls, tax scholars should read out
any implication that what we are really after is an end state of perfect
wide reflective equilibrium. The point here is not to settle the issue but
rather to highlight the difference between foundationalist and pragmatic
approaches.

61. For instance, under a "wide reflective equilibrium" analysis one must maximize coherence
not just among ethical precepts but also among all other principles in play in all areas of inquiry. See
id.
62. From a practical (pragmatic) perspective, requiring tax scholars to learn the ins and outs of
Rawls's work is likely to backfire. The fact that ethical philosophy can often be unwieldly has discouraged scholars in other areas. See, e.g., Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L.
REv. 658, 669-70 (996) (bemoaning and avoiding the "maelstrom" of ethical theory). Instead of
requiring tax scholars to learn all of Rawls's work, for instance, the approach advocated in this
article sets the bar significantly lower, requiring only everyday language and analytical skills to
address fairness issues. In advocating ordinary language and moving away from philosophical/
theoretical language, the pragmatic approach generates some criticisms. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note
30. The emphasis on language would draw at least implicit support from others, however. For example, Rorty writes:
To say that the world is out there... is to say.. that most things in space and time are
the effects of causes which do not include human states. To say that truth is not out there
is simply to say that where there are no sentences them is no truth, that sentences are
elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations.
Richard Rorty, The Contingencyof Language, inPRAGMATISM: A CONTEMPORARY READER, supra
note 7, at 107, 109.
63. See Jeff Strnad, Periodicityand Accretion Taxation: Norms andImplementation, 99 YALE
LJ. 1817, 1833-46 (1990) (discussing the tangible and intangible benefits derived from the accumulation of wealth).
64. See Groves, supra note 24,at 109;,Warren, supra note 41, at 1094-95.
65. See Warren, supra note 35, at 1094.
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The Perfected Income Tax Principle

Examining the use of the perfected income tax principle in the consumption tax debate is a useful way to identify another manifestation of
formalism in the tax policy discourse: the tendency to evaluate tax policy
by matching tax system to normative base. The perfected income tax
arguments have this formalist/matching quality. The matching of base to
system may contribute less than we think to the resolution of fairness
questions. The perfected income tax principle seeks a fair measure of
aggregate wealth. It considers the income tax a poor measure of aggregate wealth, and thus endorses a consumption tax as a surrogate measure--a "perfected income tax." Under one form of the perfected income
tax principle, the current income tax is viewed as unfair because it overtaxes savers by taxing the interest payments they receive on nonconsumed funds. The argument is that, when measured in terms of subjective utility, this interest does not represent a real accretion to wealth because it is merely compensation for the pain and suffering of deferred
consumption.' Accordingly, it is said to be unfair to tax the saver because she has already suffered from her deferral of consumption and the
interest from deferral is therefore not really income in an appropriately
cognizable sense."" A consumption tax, by contrast, which exempts such
interest payments from taxation, is said to be a better measure of aggregate wealth, a perfected income tax which fully accounts for the subjective utility measure of income.
The first thing to note about the perfected income tax argument for
the fairness of the consumption tax is its formalist, conditional quality. It
posits the income/accretion base as an ideal and argues that a consumption tax better approximates this ideal. It remains facially noncommittal
66. The point is best illustrated by a simple example. Spender, who earns $100 and immediately spends it, has enjoyed the full present value of the $100. Thus, a tax on the $100 accurately
captures his wealth, taking into account the full utility that Spender has received from the $100.
Saver, by contrast, who saves the $100 and collects $10 of interest, does not really gain in wealth by
$10, under this theory, because the $10 is merely payment for the disutility of deferring consumption. Thus, both Saver and Spender actually receive the same aggregate wealth increase from the
$100, whether they save it or spend it. Fried, supra note 29, at 967-68. For purposes of the current
discussion, the distinction between riskless return and return from risk is not examined. The general
difficulty in measuring subjective utility applies to both returns, even assuming that the risk component can be reasonably construed as compensation for the "discomfort" of bearing uncertainty. Il at
990-94; see Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a
ConsumptionTax a DebateAbout Risk? Does it Matter?, 47 TAx L. REV. 377, 397 (1992) (arguing
that taxpayers can avoid the discriminatory impact of an income tax on the risk component of interest); see also Bankman & Fried,supranote 34.
67. See Fried, supranote 29, at 968.
68. As is well known, this base is referred to as the Haig-Simons tax base. Under the HaigSimons base the income tax system should tax aggregate annual increases in personal income. "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1)the market value of rights exercised in
consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between te beginning
and end of the period in question." HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
The formalist use of the Haig-Simons base is discussed in Livingston, supra note 6. at 375-80,
McCaffery, supra note I, at 75, 77.
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on which tax base is better. Accordingly, it is not really a fairness argument at all, but rather a more formal exercise, taken up after such basic
decisions have been made. This process is much like the process economists use for evaluating systems against normative bases. For an explicit
argument about fairness in the tax policy discourse, however, this agnosticism is rather unsatisfactory.
The interesting question for purposes of this article is what accounts
for the prevalence of this formalist/matching mode of analysis?' One
distinct possibility is that a bad foundationalist metaphor is to blame.
Under this metaphor, rational inquiry proceeds by building on independent premises. Thus, it might seem natural to proceed by stating an ideal
base and measuring the system to see if the system follows from, or
matches, the base. The problem is that analysis does not always, if ever,
proceed in this way.' Rather than matching, the metaphor of balancing is
better at making clear that the premises of analysis are themselves at
issue. Under the influence of the matching metaphor, by contrast, there is
a risk of thinking that demonstrating a mismatch between system (our
income tax) and base (the stated ideal) is saying more than it is about the
desirability of the tax system.' A pragmatic balancing approach to fairness issues would better focus.
4.

The Nondiscrimination Principle

The last foundational principle addressed here is the most patently
metaphysical. The nondiscrimination principle explicitly uses a no-tax
world as the foundation by which to evaluate our actual tax system
through the principle's parity of treatment between "similarly situated"
taxpayers in a no-tax and tax-filled world:' Thus, the nondiscrimination
principle supports a consumption tax as fairer because a consumption tax
preserves the relative benefits of saving in a no-tax world and leaves

69. For an acknowledgment of the puzzling fact that perfected income tax arguments have
been accepted for so long, see Fried, supra note 29, at 996. As noted above, this article views formalism as a symptom of foundationalism, rather than the problem itself.
70. This account of analysis is not even universally accepted in the traditional philosophy of
science. See Boyd, supra note 30, at 113.
71. Thus concluding that our tax system does not match an assumed base says nothing in itself
about the desirability of our system. Policy debates which focus on matching alone nn the risk of
becoming semantic. See, e.g., Jeff Stmad, Taxation of Income from Capital: A TheoreticalReappralsal,37 STAN.L. REv. 1023 (1985) (using finance economics to show that a cash flow tax, rather
than an income tax is a better match to the Haig-Simons base); Louis Kaplow & Alvin C. Warren,
Jr., An Income Tax by Any Other Name-A Reply to ProfessorStrnad,38 STAN. L REv. 399 (1986)
(arguing that Stmad simply changed the definition of the income tax base); Jeff Stmad, The Bankruptcy of Conventional Tax Timing Wisdom Is Deeper Than Semantics: A Rejoinder to Professors
Kaplow andWarren, 39 STAN,.L. ReV. 389 (1987) (countering the semantics charge); Louis Kaplow
& Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Professor Strnad's Rejoinder: Simply Semantics, 39 STAN. L. REv. 419

(1987).
72.

See Fried, supra note 29, at 963-66, 1010.
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taxpayers indifferent (from a tax perspective) between saving and
spending once a consumption tax is imposed."
As is recognized, the problem with the nondiscrimination principle
as a mantra in tax law is that it skips over why tax law should or should
not discriminate in any particular case.' Andrews, for instance, invokes
notions of horizontal equity in his support of a consumption tax, without
defining equality in any great depth." What is missing from the formalistic uses of the nondiscrimination principle is an explanation of why the
no tax world is the appropriate base:'
The analysis in this article suggests that an underlying foundationalism accounts for the prevalence of formalistic uses of the nondiscrimination principle. After all, foundationalism is just the grounding of principles of justice in a world outside of our current circumstances, interests, and customs. Like the original position, the no-tax world functions
as a foundational source of correctness in tax law." The nonfoundationalist, pragmatic approach, by contrast, views other-world groundings
with some skepticism. Indeed, from a pragmatic perspective, the no-tax
world seems particularly odd as a ground norm. This is because (for one
thing) changing the tax system to the ideal in mid-stream, after social life
and other aspects of regulation have built up around the "wrong" system,
may be more unfair than implementing no change at all. Most importantly, it is because pragmatism views gestures to ahistorical sources of
authority as presumptively metaphysical. Rather than taking the no-tax
world as the normative foundation for fairness, a pragmatic approach
would identify savers and spenders in the real world and ask whether
they should be treated equally by the tax system. Putting the question this
way highlights the fairness issue that, perhaps more than any other fairness concern, stands in the way of wide spread acceptance of the consumption tax: savers are richer than spenders and switching to a consumption
tax seems at first blush to disproportionately benefit the already
7
rich. 8

73. See id. at 961-66. There are, of course, efficiency arguments based on the no-tax world
hypothetical. See, e.g., KLEIN & BANKMAN, supra note 17, at 23.
74. See Louis Kaplow, HorizontalEquity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT'L TAX
J. 139, 140 (1989) (noting the "failure to identify the normative justification for [then] current uses
of [horizontal equity]" and identifying those bases).
75. See Andrews, supra note 35, at 1165-67 (discussing the likelihood that a consumptiontype tax will treat taxpayers fairly by imposing similar burdens).
76. See Fried, supra note 29, at 1006 (noting the failure of consumption tax advocates to
explain and support the theory that both "savers and nonsavers have an entitlement to the relative
levels of well-being they would have enjoyed in a no-tax world').
77. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JuSTICE 136-37 (1971) (describing the use of the

"original position" as a ground for justice).
78. Cf. Banknum & Fried, supra note 34 (showing how the effects of switching to a consumption tax may be overstated).
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B. The ProgressivityDebate
The tax policy debate on progressivity focuses on the fairness of

wealth redistribution through a progressive tax. One system of progressivity involves increasing the percentage of tax paid to the government in
proportion to increases in income.7 ' Progressivity is achieved in our current system of taxation through graduated marginal rates.!* Increasing
marginal rates is not the only way to achieve progressivity. A proportionate, or a flat tax, where each dollar is taxed at the same rate, can be

progressive if it is combined with an exemption, or with demogrants to
lower-income taxpayers." Similarly, even a pure consumption or sales
tax can be progressive if combined with exemptions for consumption for
essentials of certain basic needs, or with rebates or credits.'

The desirability of progressivity from an equity perspective has
been the subject of discussion within the legal literature on tax policy for
more than 40 years. The starting point in this debate is Walter J. Blum
and Harry Kalven, Jr.'s, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation,'
published in 1953. In this work, Blum and Kalven place the burden of
persuasion on the proponents of progressivity," and after examining the
various arguments for progressivity, conclude that the burden has not
been met.' Given that the case for progressivity was so "uneasy," Blum
and Kalven's argument supported a flat or proportionate tax system."
The most significant rebuttal to Blum and Kalven's view came in 1987,
when Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith applied optimal taxation
theory to demonstrate that the case for progressivity was less uneasy than
previously asserted.Y

79. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 25, at 1907.
80. Thus, the federal income tax rate for singles increases from 15% for income below
$22,101 to 39.6% for income above $250,000. L.R.C. § I (West Supp. 1998).
81. Under Representative Anney's flat tax proposal, for instance, which provides for standard
deductions for married, joint filers and an additional standard deduction for each dependent, a family
of four earning $50,000 would pay about 6% in taxes while a family earning $200,000 would pay
about 14% in taxes. See Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995, H.R. 2060, 104th Cong. §
101; see also Jacki Calmes, Flat-Tax Plan Is Revised by Rep. Armey to Reduce ProjectedLoss of
Revenue, WALLST. J., July 20, 1995, at B12.
82. Senator Lugar's plan is an example of such a progressive consumption/sales tax system.
See Robert S. Stein, NationalIssue: Is a Major Tax OverhaulAhead? PresidentialRace May Focus
on Tax Reform Issue, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Apr. 13, 1995, at Al (addressing Senator Lugar's

plan).
83. BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 25.
84. Id. at 28-29.
85. Id. at 56; see also Walter J. Blum, Revisiting the Uneasy Casefor Progressive Taxation,
60 TAXES 16, 21 (1982) (concluding that recent changes in society have not facilitated the implementation of a progressive tax system).
86. See BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 25, at xxii. However, Blum and Kalven endorse a flat
tax with an exemption, thereby including some progressivity in their proposal. See id.
87. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 25, at 1906 (applying "recent developments in economics and moral theory" to the progressivity debate).
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For the purposes of this article, what is important about the historical debate on progressivity is its treatment of redistributive principles' A
closer reading of Blum and Kalven's work shows some implicit
metaethical commitments in their overall strategy. Specifically, it shows
an underlying foundationalism in their work which colors their conclusions.
Blum and Kalven explicitly contrast value judgments with scientific
ones." When evaluating the concept of decreasing marginal utility of
income or "sacrifice theory," which can justify progressivity on the
grounds that the rich gain less utility from dollars over a certain level of
income, for instance, Blum and Kalven remark that "[tihe ostensibly
scientific form of sacrifice theory, which purports to deal with the way
people actually react to money, frequently conceals a normative judgment either about the way that people ought to value money or about the
social value of typical expenditures at different levels of income." Blum
and Kalven seem to think that the abandonment of scientific analysis for
normative analysis itself undermines the argument for declining marginal
utility of income. Rather than explicitly considering the legitimacy of
these underlying normative judgments, Blum and Kalven associate such
judgments with the purely political (specifically, "the socialist literature")," and ultimately reject "the very idea of a 'moral scheme of consumption."' What Blum and Kalven fail to recognize is that all tax systems, progressive or flat, overtly redistributive or not, are moral schemes
of consumption. It is a mistake to think that not taxing the rich at higher
rates (and thus more) is somehow value-free or value-neutral. It appears
that Blum and Kalven make this mistake because they are foundationalists. They believe that there is an objective (a default) distribution of tax
burdens that redistributive rationales are challenging. By locating the
arguments for progressivity closer to the political than to the scientific,
Blum and Kalven set up a foundationalist dichotomy which caricatures
redistributive rationales as groundless, political, even unsettling." The

88. As with the literature on fairness in the consumption tax, discussions of distributive justice
rationales for progressivity have become increasingly diverse and not always susceptible to the
description as foundationalist. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Komhauser, Equality, Liberty, and a Fair Income Tax, 23 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 607, 607-14 (1996) (applying different principles of distributive

justice).
89. See BLUM & KALVEN, supranote 25, at 68-69.
90. See id.at 69.
91. See id. at 72-73.
92. Id. at 69; see also SIMONS, supra note 25, at 4-5 (rejecting declining marginal utility of
income justifications for progressivity because of its normative character); id. at 18-19 (viewing
progressive taxation as being based merely on "the ethical or aesthetic judgment that the prevailing
distribution of wealth and income reveals a degree (and/or kind) of inequality which is distinctly evil

or unlovely").
93. As Blum and Kalven wrote:
The lingering fear must always have been that any case for progression on [redistributive]
grounds proves too much. It has been seen that it is quite difficult to sponsor progression
on the basis of economic equality without calling into question either the meaningfulness
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pragmatic, nonfoundationalist approach rejects this dichotomy altogether, asking not whether the case for progressivity is strong enough to
overcome the presumption in favor of a flat rate, but rather how the case
for more redistribution compares with the case for less redistribution.
Thus, the pragmatic questions are things like: Do we want to live in a
society where a tiny percentage of the population owns the vast majority
of the wealth and a large percentage of the population lives hand to
mouth? If not, is redistribution through the tax system the best way to get
us what we want?" While these questions may be politically charged,
they are not "merely" political. All policy judgments are political in this
sense. The trick is finding a reasonable compromise between competing
norms. The pragmatic approach, unlike the foundationalist approach,
provides a philosophical justification for this type of analysis. To further
examine the difference between the pragmatic approach and the formalist/foundationalist approach in the progressivity debates, it is useful to
examine two basic principles which play an important role in the debate.
Accordingly, the remainder of this section briefly examines the
Nozickian justice in transfer principle and the Rawlsian maximin principle from a pragmatic, nonfoundationalist perspective.
1. The Nozickian Justice in Transfer Principle
By setting up a dichotomy between redistributive taxation and taxation that respects to a greater extent the market allocation of income,
Blum and Kalven implicitly endorse market distributions as presumptively just or natural. A pragmatic, nonfoundationalist approach views
such moves with suspicion. This suspicion, it turns out, is justified. Specifically, the main problem with using the market as a foundation is that
markets, even efficient ones, are not necessarily fair. By assuming markets as a baseline for fairness, foundationalist approaches snuff out
analysis before it starts. A nonfoundationalist, pragmatic approach views
market allocations just as man-made as post-market redistributions. They
are fair or unfair according to our norms and traditions. Under a pragmatic form of analysis, the question is whether in a particular case a
market allocation is fair. It is important to emphasize that pragmatic
analysis does not provide an overarching theory of fairness or justice that
is applied to particular facts. Instead, pragmatic analysis takes smaller
steps, identifying problems as they come up and proposing solutions
after gathering as much information as possible. Thus, rather than proof personal responsibility

or the fairness with which the market distributes rewards. Progression, when offered on these grounds, is an unsettling idea.
BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 25, at 85; see also LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND
SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 132 (1932) (describing ethical determinations as amounting to
claims about "thy blood or mine").
94. For an analysis supporting the argument that tax law may be a desirable means to address
distributive norms, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient
Than the Income Tax in RedistributingIncome, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
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viding a defense, or critique of the fairness of market allocations in general, pragmatic analysis reminds us that "it depends." This distinction
between pragmatic, ad hoc, provisional analysis and broader theory
building is important to emphasize. This distinguishes the pragmatic
form of analysis advocated in this article from interdisciplinary work that
applies all encompassing theories of justice (A la Rawls and Nozick) to
tax policy problems. The pragmatic approach rests on the claim that such
theories are not necessary for settling practical policy issues. Take for
example, Nozick's theory of "justice in transfer,"'' that one is entitled as
a matter of right to the value received in market trades (under certain
conditions). Does this theory help in determining when redistribution is
justified? The pragmatic approach asks us to entertain the notion that the
answer is "No," that there is nothing about the theory per se that offers
insight. Rather, the value of reading and applying Nozick lies in bringing
more perspectives and information we have not anticipated into the data
set so we can make a more informed decision. Thus, a pragmatic approach would not be interested in, for instance, poking holes in Nozick's
theory. Rather, a pragmatic approach would use Nozick's work as a
source of counterexample and competing perspective? '
We simply do not need to comprehensively examine the justice in
transfer principle, or any other theory of justice in order to get on with
policy analysis.'7 Pragmatic analysis suggests that no theory or foundational principle is necessary for resolving practical policy issues. It provides a philosophical basis for grappling with these problems anyway.
The questions it asks are quite basic: Is the wealth distribution that exists
one that we can live with? Are there other possibilities that would reduce
suffering and make our society more just?" Our answers to these ques-

95. ROBERT NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 152(1974).
96. 'The pragmatic approach, in other words, would probably discourage taking a "Nozickian"
approach to a particular problem. Addressing the problem in theoretical language invites theoretical
questions about, for instance, the coherence of Nozick's system and moves away from the practical
question of how to solve the particular problem. One such theoretical question is whether under
justice in transfer one deserves a market price that is high not because of the skill of the owner, but
merely because of the scarcity of the resoures owned. In this case, it is not clear that one deserves
the full reward and that taxing and redistributing would be unfair. John Locke, for instance, can be

read as denying that one is entitled to the value of property in exchange to the degree such value is
derived from the scarcity of the property exchanged. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT 16-30 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 1952). This point is discussed in Barbara Fried, Wilt
ChamberlainRevisited: Nozick's "Justicein Transfer" and the Problem ofMarket-Based Distribution, 24 PHIL & PUB. AsP. 226 (1995).
97. Thus, the pragmatic, nonfoundationalist approach looks to the practical use value of the
theory and tries, as much as possible, to analyze its "value for concrete life." See James, supra note
59, at 62.
98. Indeed, if there were a foundationalist principle in nonfoundationalist pragmatism it is that
relieving suffering is a baseline norm. See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND
SOLIDARITY 141 (1989). In justifying such baseline norms, however, nonfoundationalist pragmatism

would avoid deep justifications and instead offers the reassurance that:
We should just thank our lucky stars that there am quite a lot of people nowadays who
are pretty consistently appalled by human beings suffering unnecessarily. With
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tions are no less legitimate because they lack ultimate foundations or
correspond to a general theory of justice.
2. The Rawlsian Maximin Principle
The Rawlsian maximin principle has been extremely important in
justifying progressivity on fairness grounds." As used in the tax policy
debates, the maximin principle states that the utility of the least well-off
is weighted more heavily in a utilitarian calculus to determine the optimal tax rate."° Examining approaches to scrutinizing this principle is
ueful for distinguishing the pragmatic approach. The first thing to note
is that arguments for redistribution to the least well-off as a good thing to
do are different in kind than arguments for redistribution because it is
correct under Rawls's theory. The latter approach lends the weight of
Rawls's theory to support a liberal principle of redistribution. The former
does not have this type of pedigree. It is useful to ask whether the weight
of Rawls's theory really adds anything to the persuasiveness of the call
for taking care of the least well-off. Indeed, the pragmatic approach asserts what Rawls's approach seems to deny: that the maximin principle is
just one among many principles that gets its force from our tradition of
equality, compassion, or liberalism. On the contrary, the point of backing
up redistribution with Rawls's theory is to give it some sense of objectivity. After all, the maximin principle is "true" under Rawls's system
not merely because it comports with our modem liberal notions," but
because it is derived from an original position in which parties would
agree to the principle in a hypothetical contract behind the veil of ignorance before they know their station in society.
The pragmatic approach views such attempts at objective grounding
as not worth the trouble. Indeed, if you press the foundationalist claim a
bit, it seems quite unstable. Is the maximin really what we would agree
to behind the veil of ignorance? Doesn't requiring the voting parties in
the original position to accept, for instance, the equal worth and dignity

luck--and especially affluence and security---there will be more and mom such people.
Some of them will be liberal ironists like Nabokov, Bloom and Derrida himself....
Some of them will be unimaginative, literal-minded, unromantic, decent dullards. We can
use as many of both kinds of people as we can get.
Richard Rorty, Response to Simon Critchley, in DECoNSTRUCrIoN AND PRAGMATISM 41, 42
(Chantal Mouffe ed., 1996).
99. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 25, at 1916.

100. See id.
101. Rawls's use of the original position to justify the institutions of classical liberalism has
been criticized as "rationalization of the political status quo." RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGTrS
SERIOUSLY 182 (1977) (noting this criticism). The pragmatic approach suggested in this article takes
seriously the interpretation of Rawls's theory as largely an expost justification for our liberal heritage.
102. This type of foundationalism is the flip side of the foundationalism (like that of Blum and
Kalven) which treats fairness principles as empty of meaning and not susceptible to truth determinations. Rather than dismissing fairness questions as meaningless, constructivism establishes alternative grounds (such as the veil of ignorance) for fairness principles.
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of each individual make the original position a fixed game where the
"right" results are preordained? These are questions that are quite removed from the question of whether and to what degree redistribution is
appropriate. Rather than construct a system of justice around basic principles, the pragmatic approach enters the process in mid-stream evaluating each principle or suggestion from a more practical perspective."
For example, the pragmatic approach would ask whether the
maximin principle is a good idea by noting, for instance, that it seems

rather extreme since it would lead to "perfect equalization, that is, 100percent taxation above a certain level, with corresponding subsidies below it."'" This raises serious incentive and efficiency problems which
would sensibly prevent it from being carried out within the tax system."
Furthermore, taken to its extreme, it would seem to require questionable
social policies such as keeping people in vegetative states alive even at
the expense of reducing the rest of society to poverty." Of course, one
may be able to read Rawls in a way that accounts for these objections.'"

To even raise these questions supports the pragmatist point: whether a
given proposal fits into Rawls's theory is not always relevant to whether
the proposal is justified. Theory fit is a different question thanS whether

the principle is one we should embrace. The pragmatic approach is interested primarily in the latter question. Detached from its theoretical base,

putting the poor first seems to make sense. It is a dysfunctional society
that has a significant portion of the population eating out of garbage cans
or sleeping on the street."U Fortunately, such a claim resonates in our

103. As one philosopher has described the theoretical antifoundationalist approach,
[]it attempts to begin from within a particular ethical perspective, working outward to explore common ground with other perspectives, requiring neither the antecedent identification of a privileged class or statements that issue from an objective point of view nor
conclusive positions on canonical problems in philosophy. Despite the absence of a
genuinely independent perspective, the theorist can still seek to codify the moral perspective of the particular agents in question. For example, in thinking about euthanasia,
we might begin with the conviction that it is a matter of individual choice and that therefore the decision should be left to the patient. Upon further reflection on the effects of
euthanasia, and our convictions that we owe things to loved ones, we might reject a rule
that leaves the decision in the hands of the patient alone.
NtHasEN, supra note 9, at 58. While this approach is similar to Rawls's conception of equilibrium, it
does not assume or require any theoretical process of construction from behind a veil of ignorance.
104. See KENNETH J. ARRow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls's Theory of Justice,
in CoLLECmD PAPERS OF KENNE J. ARRow: SOCIAL CHOICE AND JUSTICE 96, 110 (1983).
105. See id.
106. See id. at 102-03.
107. Instead of defining the least well-off in such specific terms, for instance, Rawls seems to
choose a more general approach, defining the least well-off as something like the average wealth and
income of members of a particular social position while eschewing any more precise philosophical
definitions of this category. The more malleable definition might avoid the reductio ad absurdum
argument against Rawls.
108. Beyond reducing human suffering, redistribution might also create greater participation
and cohesion in our social, political, and cultural life. For an argument that redistribution increases
political participation and social commitment and is thus desirable, see ACKERMAN & ALSTorr,
supra note 3. For a nonfoundationalist pragmatist, an appropriate response to someone who rejects
redistribution in the face of abject poverty is not to offer them a theory but to tell them a story or

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1

culture. The important activity for tax policy analysts is to attend to this
culture by adding to its narrative, not matching principle to theory.
IV. THE PRAGMATIC "METHOD"
The philosophical tradition of American pragmatism informs the
nonfoundationalist approach advocated in this article. The pragmatism
urged here tries to change the language of fairness from formalism and
philosophical theory to the more contextualized and practical. It gives
policy analysts a reason to drop the question, "What is the appropriate
ground for our ethical beliefs?" and replace it with, "What should we do
in this particular case?" The main reason for dropping the former is its
failure to help solve the problem at hand and its potential to distract efforts at resolution of the problem.' Obviously, there is more than a little
irony in using nonfoundationalist pragmatism (a philosophical theory) to
justify walking away from philosophical theory."° Thus, the question
arises whether philosophical pragmatism is useful at all. Indeed, the bulk
of this article has addressed purely methodological issues on a fairly high
level of abstraction. Accordingly, the article arguably engages in the
same type of philosophical theorizing that it claims to avoid.
Obviously, this article claims the answer is "yes," or at least to a degree. Reviewing the pragmatic method and comparing it to foundationalism and the use of theories of justice shows tax scholars that they can
take fairness seriously without bringing in Rawls or Dworkin. Put another way, the nonfoundationalist pragmatic project operates on two levels. On one level it counters explicit philosophical doctrines on the status
of ethical claims. The strategy is a patently philosophical enterprise, conducted at a high level of abstraction in discussions of methodology. On
the other level, the nonfoundationalist method consists not of talking
about method or philosophy, but in redescribing the world in ways that
help us see the parameters of the fairness issues at stake and what the
world might look like upon their resolution. On this practical level, nonfoundationalism, as a philosophical doctrine debunking objective truth,
drops away and we are left with our other ways of speaking (literary,
descriptive, evangelical, romantic) to guide us through the problems we

drive them around some really bad parts of town. If the person remains unconvinced, nonfoundationalist pragmatism offers nothing more except to ask: What happened to you anyway?
109. Putting these practical questions in theoretical/philosophical language might therefore
encourage "moral holidays," See James, supra note 59, at 64 ("1 have enough trouble in life already
without adding the trouble of carrying (metaphysical conundums].").
110. Indeed, pragmatism's nonfoundationalist claims has generated a great deal of theoretical
debate. See, e.g., SUSAN HAACK, EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY: TOWARDS RECONSTRUCTION IN

EPISTEMOLOGY 182-202 (1993) (criticizing Rorty's epistemological claims).
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face. On this practical level, nonfoundationalist pragmatism is best described as a temperament rather than a philosophical method."
The pragmatic approach's emphasis on temperament rather than
theory becomes clear when one compares it to the strategy suggested
recently by Professor McCaffery, who has recently examined the dominant strategies in the tax policy discourse. Like the analysis in this article, McCaffery identifies formalism as the dominant methodology of the
tax policy discourse. In contrast to this article's approach, however,
McCaffery advocates an "interpretive-political approach" based on John
' 2
Rawls's theory of justice or Ronald Dworkin's concept of integrity.
The interpretive-political approach of Rawls and Dworkin is based on the
belief that "[wlords alone cannot answer [the difficult policy issues in tax
law]; we need principles.""' By contrast, the approach in this article deemphasizes foundational principles and argues that words alone are all
we have and all we need. From a pragmatic perspective, the interpretivepolitical approach gestures at something beyond the natural language of
fairness, like integrity or reason."4 While the interpretive-political approach purports to abandon a certain variant on foundationalism (formalism), the pragmatic approach views the interpretive-political approach as a species of foundationalism. The pragmatic approach moves
away from using philosophical theories of justice as grounds for our fair-

11l. William James describes pragmatism by comparing the pragmatist, a "happy-go-lucky
anarehistic sort of creature" with the "doctrinaire and authoritative complexion" of the rational mind
(the foundationalist James was attacking). James, supranote 59, at 71. Translated into the context of
the tax policy discourse, the difference in temperament is between the formalist modeler and the
storyteller.
The two levels of nonfoundationalist pragmatism can be viewed as two separate "language
games," each appropriate for certain purposes and certain contexts. This article does not move away
from foundationalism so much because of its philosophical error, but because another vocabulary at
this point might enrich the tax policy discourse on fairness. It is a claim about relative usefulness,
not about relative accuracy or correctness, to urge that we "in fact say little about these [philosophical] topics, and see how we get on." See Rorty, supra note 8, at 111. Thus, the difference between
the suggested nonfoundationalist pragmatic "method" and the traditional foundationalist method
might just be the difference between "an entrenched vocabulary which has become a nuisance and a
half-formed new vocabulary which vaguely promises great things." Id. at 1 2
112. See McCaffery, supranote 1, at 82-84.
113. Id.at84.
114. By contrast, the approach in this article adopts the view that "there is nothing beyond
vocabularies." STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TExT INThis CLASS? 354-55 (1980). This is more useful
than the view that there is something beyond language which can help us decide which proposition,
description, or imperative is better than the next. Positing something beyond words merely raises a
host of philosophical questions that are not useful for solving the fairness problems at hand. To
quote Richard Rorty on a similar point:
[l1f we stick to the picture of language as a medium, something standing between the self
and the nonhuman reality with which the self seeks to be in touch, we have made no progress .... mhe seesaw battles between romanticism and moralism, and between idealism
and realism, will continue as long as one thinks there is a hope of making sense of the
question of whether a given language is "adequate to a task"-either the task of properly
expressing the nature of the human species, or the task of properly representing the
structure of nonhuman reality.
Rorty, supra note 8, at 113-14.
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ness evaluations. The approach advocated in this article abandons any
"attempt to see the patterns of justification within normal discourse as
more than just such patterns... [as well as any] attempt to see them as
hooked on to something which demands moral commitment-Reality,
Truth, Objectivity, Reason."" 5
McCaffery uses both Rawls and Dworkin in his theory. The foundationalist appeal of Rawls was examined above. It is beyond the scope
of this article to analyze Dworkin's theory in great detail. However, it
can be said that the pragmatic approach embraces the type of checkerboard approach Dworkin's theory of integrity seeks to overcome.""
Dworkin's theory explicitly rejects a checkerboard pattern of decision
making, thus rejecting the provisional, ad hoc style of analysis advocated
in this article. Instead Dworkin's theory places integrity as the master
principle. For example, in order for our hybrid consumption/income tax
system to be justified under Dworkin's theory, it would have to conform
to the principle of integrity. By contrast, the pragmatic approach would
accept the hybrid income/consumption tax system if the system was justified by reasons which have nothing to do with integrity, but with the
more practical concerns of administrability, fairness and economic efficiency. This is not to say that consistency would not be desirable. It is
just to say that it would not be the guiding principle of tax policy. Under
a pragmatic approach, furthermore, full integrity may simply be too
much to ask.""
V. CONCLUSION

This article criticizes how a tradition of formalism in the tax policy
discourse affects discussions of fairness, arguing that it is rooted in foundationalism. It advocates a pragmatic nonfoundationalist strategy which
lends philosophical credibility to dropping the need for objectivity altogether. Tax scholars should discuss fairness in the same language they
discuss the fairness of a tip, or any other day-to-day interaction. This
115. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 385 (1980). Unlike the
interpretive-political approach, which has "one foot in our actual, contingent, historically situated

community and context, and another foot in political, social, and moral theory," the nonfoundationalist approach tries to step out of philosophical theory altogether. McCaffery, supra note 1, at 87.
116. See James D. A. Boyle, Legal Fiction,38 HASTINGS LJ. 1013, 1020-22 (1987); see also
Allan C. Hutchinson, The Three 'Rs': ReadinglRortylRadically, 103 HARV. L.REV. 555, 579 (1989)
(reviewing RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY (1989), and comparing
Dwodin's foundationalism to Rorty's method of checkerboard conventions and anecdots); Richard
Rorty, PostimodernistBourgeoisLiberalism, in HERMENEUrICS AND PRAXIS 214, 215 (R. Hollinger
ed., 1985) (criticizing Dworkin's theory as foundationalist). Thew has been a serious, often heated
debate between Dworkin and Rorty concerning the derivation and status of the integrity principle.
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism,RightAnswers, and True Banality, in PRAGMATISM INLAW
AND SoCIETY 359, 359 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991) (explaining his belief that
Rorty's "new" pragmatism does not contribute to legal theory).
117. See DWORKIN, supranote 101, at 105 (positing a lawyer of superhuman skill as a model of
principled adjudication).
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language is all we have and all we need to adjudicate fairness claims.
Obviously, the more perspectives and information the better and this is
the role interdisciplinary work might play. Incorporating all encompassing theories of justice to give foundation to our principles, however, may
not be the most constructive strategy as a practical matter or the most
defensible philosophically. Far better that tax policy discourse echo the
natural, not specialized, language of fairness.

